Thursday, June 6, 2013

Week 10 Blog Review by Ryan Briggs and Johnny Mendoza


Mr. Cooper: “Frankenstein Meets The Rime-Man”
Bill touches on Shelley’s and Zizek’s text via a discussion of Coleridge's navigation through human history of what we would describe as the ideology of "liberal optimism," which represents a view of human progress that owes much to the Rousseauian belief in humankind's natural benevolence. Bill indirectly asks us to recall how Shelley herself represents her own rejection of this ideology in 
Frankenstein with the catastrophe that is Frankenstein's rejection of the monster and the monster's own subsequent hatred and perusal of Frankenstein himself. In another point addressed in the blog, Bill argues that Zizek would agree with the progressions of Coleridge's own tracing of modernity's origins to ultimately what Bills terms "the fractionalization of knowledge into specialization." Bill ends his post by arguing that Coleridge’s Rime is a poem that addresses modernity. He cites the work of Matthias Rudolf, who argues that Rime allegorizes Coleridge's theory of criticism.

Ms. Vales: “Solitude in the Wilderness”
Yuliana argues for a certain thematic connection between that of an article she one day "stumbled across," and Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein. According to the story in the article, to avoid persecution at the hands of the Russian Bolsheviks, the Lykovs, a Russian Orthodox couple, abandoned their home in 1936 and were thought to have died somewhere unknown thereafter. However, in 1978, much to everyone’s surprise, the couple were found living 6,000 feet up a mountain with four children in tow. Five members in all, (the wife had died), the Lykovs had managed to live on their own despite their being completely severed from civilization. A sad story, shortly after the family’s discovery by scientists, three of the four children would end up dying from exposure to outside diseases. Yuliana speaks of her fascination with the story, writing how inconceivable it is to think how these events happened not in the remote past but rather just relatively recently. The connection she makes between the Lykov story and Shelley’s Frankenstein is in her speculation as to how lonely the family members must have felt living by themselves for so long and the similar feelings of loneliness expressed by Shelley’s monster. Yuliana ends her post by pointing out how similar to the family’ alienation on the mountain, the monster also had no one but himself to rely on.

Ms. Cacace: “Zizek and Ecology”
Rosanna outlines the ideas of Zizek’s article, but not without adding her own comments. For example, she thinks much of Zizek’s point about how deceptively insignificant it is about the world’s dwindling honeybee population, agreeing the crisis to be something we are unlikely to consider, only to then find ourselves struggling later with due to the several unforeseen consequences. Also, she initially found Zizek’s idea about the worldwide implementation of egalitarian justice as a solution to our ecological problems to be attractive, saying that if “king of the world” herself she would have to consider it. However, after giving it more thought, she doubted (wisely, if you ask me) the wisdom of such a plan, wondering, for instance, as to who would be responsible for the overseeing of the world. She argues that anyone with such power would likely “exploit” the situation for their “own political agenda.” 
Mr. Ross: “Hypothesis Regarding Safi’s Love Letters”
Scott offers his theory as to why Safi’s letters are missing in Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein, as they are in many ways at the center of the novel. For Scott, the central question revolves around the veracity of the letters and how we as readers might feel confident about what they say. After providing some background information about the letters themselves, Scott argues that the key to the letters’ significance lies in a certain novel by Rousseau called: Julie, or the New Heloise, a book that had been originally titled Letters of Two Loves Living in a Small Village at the Foot of the Alps. Scott’s argument, in brief, is that Safi’s letters bear what Rousseau in Julie might identify as the marks of real passion, (i.e., boring, unremarkable repetitions), and that marks such as these self-authenticate their own veracity. Scott ends his blog by reminding us that “the position of the letters at the center of the novel gives them additional importance. In concentric narratives, also known as chiastic narratives, the center of the narrative is emphasized as a key that provides an understanding of the greater work.”

Mr. Ross: “Books for Bones: The Intertextuality of Frankenstein”
Scott argues that
Frankenstein is Shelley’s romanticization of the popular philosophical arguments of her day. He finds evidence within the novel for Rousseau’s Emile and Julie, Milton’s Paradise Lost, the Bible, William Godwin’s Political Justice and Caleb Williams, as well as her mother Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women. He notes Frankenstein’s intertextuality in particular with Rousseau’s Emile, specifically in how the novel
presents the subject of education. Walton, Victor Frankenstein, the creature, and Felix, not to mention the minor characters, are what Scott calls “variances of the course of education laid out in Rousseau’s seminal tract.” He makes an interesting connection between Emile and Shelley’s gothic tale in the form of a single sentence from Rousseau’s text stating the following: “The rebellious angle who fought against his own nature was weaker than the happy mortal who is living at peace according to nature.” This certainly describes the creature well, and makes sense as something Shelley might have had in the back of her mind while writing. 




Jeff Anderson: “Splintered Identity: Franken-monster”
 Jeff begins his blog by focusing on Zizek’s comments that biotechnology has created a divide between the so called first and second natures: first nature is described as that which is comprehensible and beneficial to humanity, while second nature refers to anything that is genetically modified or enhanced, and could create a problem for humans to have control over. Jeff links these ideas to Frankenstein, particularly at the point in which Dr. Frankenstein crosses the line between first and second natures, by creating life, but a life out of his control. Jeff refers back to Zizek’s point that safety is not necessarily the opposite of fear, but rather “pushing on to the end and accepting the nullity we are afraid to lose.” Jeff then says that this is what fuels the rest of the novel, as seen through Frankenstein’s pursuit of the monster and his unquenchable anger towards the monster.
Alfred Valrie: “Zizek’s Follies”
Alfred’s post explores more deeply the relationship between religion and economics, as Zizek briefly mentions. Alfred claims fear, as a negative motivation, can be a good and necessary thing. Religion and environmentalism both share the principle, respectively, of improving the country’s safety, but are seen as evil, according to Zizek. Then Alfred makes a distinction between the Christian narrative’s views of spreading prosperity versus Zizek’s views. The former has helped other people flourish and thrive, while recognizing that a utopian vision of total equality is unattainable: “Some will have much, others not so much.” But this is not inhumane. The latter, Zizek’s vision, “terror would reinforce the State’s governing of egalitarian resource utilization,” without allowing people to independently arrive at the motivation of helping one’s neighbor, and by extension, the natural world.
Dimitrios Sotiriou: “From ‘Nihilism’ to ‘Justice’”
Dimitrios focuses on the main outlines of Zizek’s argument, which is his denial in the existence of a “Big Other,” or reality. Despite this nihilism, Zizek, similar to what Nietzsche did by privileging the will-to-power, fills the void with a worldview of his own. To elaborate, science and technology, capitalism, and even evolution have, arguably, shown how nature is unnatural. Dimitrios then discusses Zizek’s critique of ecology as a false alternative to capital forces, because of its actual resistance to change. While Zizek challenges these ideologies (science, ecology, religion) and refuses to think of science as holding absolute authority, he no less acknowledges that these ideas have become objective realities and incapable of being dismantled. His solution, as Dimitrios notes, is that we should act as if this eternal Idea of egalitarian Justice is real and objective, while being conscious that it is an invention. But in doing so, Dimitrios asks, won’t we be reinventing the collective or spiritual super-Subject, which Zizek says does not pertain to individual human beings? More importantly, if the collective Subject and Justice are inventions, who gets to define them? And at what or whose expense? 

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